Di Paolo (2005) Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency – Page 2

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Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency

Di Paolo (2005) Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency

Abstract

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic language for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of viability. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than those given so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored.

Concepts Adaptation, Agency, Autopoiesis, Complex systems, Decentralized Self, Decentralized thinking, Systems thinking
Relevant learning goals Conceptual Thinking, Critical Thinking, Systems Thinking
Relevant subject areas Autopoiesis, Biology, Philosophy
Relevant research methods Conceptual clarification, Knowledge synthesis, Scientific clarification
Relevant projects Annotated Reading List, Decentralized Self, Understanding Agency
Relevant school improvement goals Conceptual understanding

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The Experiential Self: objections and clarifications

Zahavi, D. (2010). The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications. In Self, No Self? (pp. 56–78). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199593804.003.0003

This chapter first outlines a view regarding the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and a minimal notion of self that is widespread in the phenomenological tradition. It then discusses some of the motivations behind this proposal, and then in the main part of the chapter critically engages with various objections that have recently been raised against this view by Albahari and Dreyfus. Discussing these objections will allow for an important clarification of the view defended here. Also discussed are some of the semantic and metaphysical disagreements that separate defenders and deniers of self, concluding with some reflections regarding the relation between self and diachronic unity.

The Body Social: an enactive approach to the self

Kyselo, M. (2014). The body social: An enactive approach to the self. Frontiers in Psychology, 5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00986

This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between the outside world of objects and the brain-bound individual but rather between body-bound individuals and the outside social world. On the other hand, approaches that emphasize the constitutive relevance of social interaction processes for cognitive identity run the risk of losing the individual in the interaction dynamics and of downplaying the role of embodiment. This paper adopts a middle way and outlines an enactive approach to individuation that is neither individualistic nor disembodied but integrates both approaches. Elaborating on Jonas’ notion of needful freedom it outlines an enactive proposal to understanding the self as co-generated in interactions and relations with others. I argue that the human self is a social existence that is organized in terms of a back and forth between social distinction and participation processes. On this view, the body, rather than being identical with the social self, becomes its mediator.

The Self in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy

Zettle, R. D. (2016). The self in acceptance and commitment therapy. In M. Kyrios, R. Moulding, G. Doron, S. S. Bhar, M. Nedeljkovic, & M. Mikulincer (Eds.), The Self in Understanding and Treating Psychological Disorders (1st ed., pp. 50–58). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139941297.007

Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) is regarded as part of the “third wave” of cognitive- behavioral therapy (CBT) that has emerged over the past quarter century (Hayes, Reference Hayes2004). It is a transdiagnostic approach recognized by Division 12 of the American Psychological Association (Society of Clinical Psychology, n.d.) as having strong research support in the treatment of chronic pain and modest empirical support in addressing depression, mixed anxiety, obsessive–compulsive disorder, and psychosis. Rather than seeking to directly change problematic thoughts, emotions, and other private events, ACT and related approaches within the latest generation of CBT writ large incorporate mindfulness, acceptance, and decentering/defusion strategies to change the function of such psychological events and alter how clients relate to them (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, Reference Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda and Lillis2006). Unlike other third-wave approaches such as dialectical behavior therapy (Linehan, Reference Linehan1993), mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, Reference Segal, Williams and Teasdale2002), and metacognitive therapy (Wells, Reference Wells2009), ACT is unique in (a) being explicitly grounded within a modern pragmatic philosophy of behavioral science known as functional contextualism (Hayes, Reference Hayes, Hayes, Hayes, Reese and Sarbin1993), (b) being informed by relational frame theory as an associated account of human language and cognition (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, Reference Hayes, Barnes-Holmes and Roche2001), and (c) identifying increased psychological flexibility, or the ability to make behavioral adjustments in the service of one’s values, as its superordinate goal. Some discussion of each of these defining features of ACT is necessary to understand its stance on the self.

Psychological Flexibility as a Fundamental Aspect of Health

Kashdan, T. B., & Rottenberg, J. (2010). Psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of health. Clinical Psychology Review, 30(7), 865–878. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.03.001

Traditionally, positive emotions and thoughts, strengths, and the satisfaction of basic psychological needs for belonging, competence, and autonomy have been seen as the cornerstones of psychological health. Without disputing their importance, these foci fail to capture many of the fluctuating, conflicting forces that are readily apparent when people navigate the environment and social world. In this paper, we review literature to offer evidence for the prominence of psychological flexibility in understanding psychological health. Thus far, the importance of psychological flexibility has been obscured by the isolation and disconnection of research conducted on this topic. Psychological flexibility spans a wide range of human abilities to: recognize and adapt to various situational demands; shift mindsets or behavioral repertoires when these strategies compromise personal or social functioning; maintain balance among important life domains; and be aware, open, and committed to behaviors that are congruent with deeply held values. In many forms of psychopathology, these flexibility processes are absent. In hopes of creating a more coherent understanding, we synthesize work in emotion regulation, mindfulness and acceptance, social and personality psychology, and neuropsychology. Basic research findings provide insight into the nature, correlates, and consequences of psychological flexibility and applied research provides details on promising interventions. Throughout, we emphasize dynamic approaches that might capture this fluid construct in the real-world.

The Extended Self in a Digital World

Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended Self in a Digital World. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477–500. https://doi.org/10.1086/671052

The extended self was proposed in 1988. Since it was formulated, many technological changes have dramatically affected the way we consume, present ourselves, and communicate. This conceptual update seeks to revitalize the concept, incorporate the impacts of digitization, and provide an understanding of consumer sense of self in today’s technological environment. It is necessarily a work in progress, for the digital environment and our behavior within it continue to evolve. But some important changes are already clear. Five changes with digital consumption are considered that impact the nature of self and the nature of possessions. Needed modifications and additions to the extended self are outlined, and directions for future research are suggested. The digital world opens a host of new means for self-extension, using many new consumption objects to reach a vastly broader audience. Even though this calls for certain reformulations, the basic concept of the extended self remains vital.

Beyond the Centralized Mindset

Resnick, M. (1996). Beyond the Centralized Mindset. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 5(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327809jls0501_1

In recent years, there has been a growing fascination with decentralized systems and self-organizing phenomena. Increasingly, people are choosing decentralized models for the organizations and technologies that they construct in the world, and for the theories that they construct about the world. But even as decentralized ideas spread through the culture, there is a deep-seated resistance to such ideas. In trying to understand patterns in the world, people often assume centralized control where none exists (for example, assuming that a “leader bird” guides the rest of the flock). To probe how people think about decentralized systems, and to help them develop new ways of thinking about such systems, I developed a programmable modeling environment (called StarLogo) with which people can easily create and experiment with decentralized systems. StarLogo allows users to control the actions and interactions of thousands of artificial “creatures” on the computer screen. I describe three StarLogo projects created by high-school students. Based on my observations of these (and other) students, I analyze the nature of the centralized mindset, and I discuss how people, through engagement with new types of computational tools and activities, can begin to move beyond the centralized mindset.

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